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1000
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Abstract/Summary
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ivid visual mental imagery is thought to influence perceptual processing, but much of the current knowledge on this comes from one highly cited, though underpowered (N = 8) study from 2007, which found that more vivid imagery increases interference between imagined and perceptual content. However, that study has not been repeated since. We therefore conducted a conceptual (Experiment 1) and direct (Experiment 2) replication study. In Experiment 1, we recruited 185 online participants across the mental imagery spectrum, including individuals with self-reported aphantasia (impoverished or absent mental imagery) and hyperphantasia (extremely vivid imagery). In Experiment 2, we recruited 56 participants, 28 with self-reported aphantasia and 28 gender- and age-matched typical imagers. Consistent with the original 2007 study's interpretation, we predicted that those with more vivid imagery would exhibit stronger imagery-perception interference, as measured by decreased performance in a priming task when a color and word were congruent (e.g., red prime, word "RED") compared to incongruent (e.g., blue prime, word "RED"). We were unable to replicate this effect in either experiment. Instead, we observed performance benefits for color-word congruency across the mental imagery spectrum, with no difference in the magnitude of this effect across imagery ability or vividness, even among those with extreme imagery variations (aphantasia, hyperphantasia). Interestingly, we observed a relationship between a measure of mental imagery externalism and the congruency effect, suggesting that individuals with the ability to project their mental images into the external environment (i.e., prophantasia) may exhibit stronger congruency effects. The results of this study challenge our current understanding of the role of mental imagery in perception.
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